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We study cross-nationally whether managers view corporate social and economic responsibility as
compatible, or incompatible. The conceptual framework builds on different theories that support
alternative views of corporate responsibility compatibility. A set of hypotheses relates differences
in cultural values, corporate governance systems, and managerial education to corporate responsi-
bility compatibility. A corporate responsibility scale is developed and its cross-national invariance is
tested. Data analysis, controlling for gender and work experience, shows that in countries with large
power distance, with less strict corporate governance, and more integrated business education,
social responsibility is perceived as relatively incompatible with economic responsibility, whereas
in countries with smaller power distance, with stricter corporate governance, and more functional
business education, social and economic responsibility are perceived as more compatible.
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Introduction
Pursuing profit-oriented objectives while emphasizing corporate social responsibility is often pre-
sented by the managerial press as compatible corporate goals, especially in the long term with a
view to sustainable development (e.g. Barner, 2007; Grayson and Hodges, 2004). In the instrumen-
tal conception of corporate responsibility, meeting its social responsibility is necessary for a firm to
fulfill its economic responsibility of increasing shareholder value, making corporate social and eco-
nomic responsibility compatible (e.g. Waddock and Graves, 1997). According to this perspective,
sacrificing some profits to finance expenses associated with social responsibility makes sense
because a strong corporate image will in turn be a driver of business development (Donaldson and
Preston, 1995; Jones, 1995; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Wright and Ferris, 1997). However, it is
less clear whether corporate economic and social responsibility goals are fully compatible in the
short run, when the size of the pie is rather fixed and different goals competitively draw on limited
resources. Thus, from a competing stakeholders perspective, social responsibility may be perceived
by managers as conflicting with the economic responsibility of the firm, leading Friedman (1970) to
write that ‘a corporation’s social responsibility is to make a profit’. In this view, corporate economic
and social responsibility are perceived as largely incompatible. Whether corporate economic and
social responsibility are viewed by managers as compatible or incompatible is the focus of this
paper, especially comparatively across nations.
Conflicting empirical results about the relationship between corporate social and economic
performance (e.g. Griffin and Mahon, 1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001), even if the results of a
meta-analysis show that the relationship is slightly positive (Orlitzky et al., 2003), have created
some doubts in managers’ minds about the compatibility between the different aspects of corporate
responsibility. These doubts have also been fueled by the theoretical debate between the proponents
of the compatibility hypothesis and those of the conflicting goals hypothesis. Because corporate
responsibility is socially constructed in nature (Basu and Palazzo, 2008) and theories in social science
may be self-fulfilling (Ferraro et al., 2007; Gergen, 1973; Ghoshal, 2005), it is important to understand
how managers perceive this compatibility and which factors influence their perceptions and values.
Their perceptions and values are of particular relevance asmanagers are the primary individuals respon-
sible for the sustainability of the firm and must ensure that firms meet their corporate social responsi-
bility (Friedman, 1970; Henderson, 2001). The values that managers use to guide their decision-
making are thus critical for the implementation of socially responsible practices (Agle et al., 1999).
There are explanations for the perception of the degree of compatibility between corporate
economic and social responsibility goals differing between countries. We consider that there are
three main sources of cross-national differences: institutional, cultural, and educational. First, the
institutional environment differs across countries, influencing the rules of the game, especially the
nature of principal/agent relationships. Second, corporate social responsibility derives from
accepted values (Schein, 1986) that influence managerial decision-making by indicating which
choices and behaviors are acceptable or unacceptable. These values differ across countries (Hof-
stede, 2001). Finally, managerial education plays a key role in shaping the worldviews of future man-
agers by diffusing a particular management ideology (Ghoshal, 2005) that emphasizes compatibility
(or incompatibility) of corporate economic and social responsibility. It is important to determine how
managerial education posits ethical/social responsibility norms: whether as true ‘business goals’ in the
sense that they are to be pursued per se, as means, or as mere constraints. For instance, if the dominant
view is that social responsibility should be considered only as an instrumental goal while economic
responsibility is really the terminal goal, the perception of compatibility is encouraged.
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As a consequence, there may be significant cross-national differences in the degree to which cor-
porate economic and social responsibility are emphasized as legitimate objectives by managers.
Corporate economic and social responsibility may be considered in some countries as unrelated
issues, while in others they may be viewed as negatively related, simultaneously pursuing both eco-
nomic and social goals being perceived as difficult. Understanding which factors lead to the percep-
tion of a trade-off between corporate economic and social responsibility and which factors lead to
the perception of compatibility between the two types of responsibility is critical to improving the
image of multinational enterprises. Indeed, local views of what is a socially responsible business
may differ across countries. In some countries, social responsibility may be considered as an impe-
diment to business growth, a threat to shareholder wealth, while managers in other countries may
consider that social goals are imposed by corporate communication – a necessary tribute to be paid
for generating a positive corporate image towards a number of publics, especially consumers, share-
holders, and the general public.
This research proposes a cross-national analysis of the perception of compatibility/incompatibil-
ity between corporate economic and social responsibility goals. We seek answers to four research
questions: (1) Do future managers consider that there is some kind of trade-off between corporate
economic and social responsibility or do they perceive them as compatible? (2) Are there country
differences in the perceived importance and compatibility of economic and social goals for future
managers? (3) If any, can these differences be explained by cultural, institutional, and educational
variables? (4) Are these differences moderated by gender and work experience?
The first part presents different theories (agency theory, stewardship theory, instrumental
rationality, and stakeholder theory) related to corporate governance that support alternative views of
the compatibility of aspects of corporate responsibility. Based on Hofstede’s (2001) cultural
dimensions and institutional differences, we develop hypotheses on cross-national differences in
corporate responsibility. We also discuss whether demographics (i.e. gender and work experience)
could influence perceived compatibility as well as the emphasis put on either economic or social
responsibility. The second part is empirical, dealing with sampling and instrument development.
This study builds on the Business Goals Network data as presented in Hofstede et al. (2002). In
order to measure corporate and social responsibility, a psychometric scale was first developed at
an exploratory level. Then its cross-national invariance was assessed through multigroup confirma-
tory factor analysis. The third part deals with data analysis. After having established partial measure-
ment invariance, we apply latent mean analysis to assess the magnitude and significance of
differences across groups as concerns the degree of emphasis respectively put on economic and
social responsibility. We also assess the correlation between economic and social responsibility for
each group, as an indicator of the degree of compatibility and incompatibility between aspects of
corporate responsibility. To check the robustness of the research findings, we test alternative expla-
nations related to differences in level of economic development. The fourth part discusses the find-
ings, outlines theoretical and managerial implications, and presents the limitations of this research.
Literature review and hypotheses development
Corporate responsibility
Corporate responsibility relates to societal expectations regarding the social (discretionary, ethical,
legal) and economic conduct of business organizations (Carroll, 1979). Following McWilliams and
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Siegel (2001), we define corporate social responsibility as actions that appear to further some social
good beyond the interest of the firm and that which is required by law.
Carroll (1979, 2001) identified four types of corporate social responsibility: economic, legal,
ethical, and discretionary (or philanthropic). Economic responsibility is concerned with a firm’s
financial performance and the provision of goods and services. Legal responsibility is concerned
with compliance with societal laws and regulations. Ethical responsibility relates to following
societal moral codes of conduct, and discretionary responsibility relates to voluntary involvement
and support of wider societal entities.
Different aspects of corporate responsibility are not perceived by managers as having the same
importance. Carroll’s (1979: 499) graphical representation of the four types of corporate respon-
sibility suggests a weighting of 4:3:2:1, respectively for economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic
responsibility. Using a forced-choice scale, Aupperle and colleagues (1985) empirically measured
the relative importance of the four types of corporate responsibility for a sample of US CEOs and
confirmed Carroll’s (1979) ranking of different types of corporate responsibility, with participants
clearly placing more emphasis on economic responsibility. When the four types of responsibility
were subsequently regrouped into two broad social (discretionary, ethical, and legal) and economic
dimensions, the results showed that, when non-economic types of responsibility were taken
together, they were of much greater weight than economic responsibility. Pinkston and Carroll
(1994) later replicated Aupperle et al. (1985) with a sample of managers from multinational subsid-
iaries located in the US but with headquarters in France, Germany, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, the
UK, and the US, and found a similar ranking of the four types of corporate responsibility across
countries. However, because these studies used a forced-choice scale, they measured the relative
importance of the different forms of corporate responsibility, assuming the existence of a trade-
off between them.
Corporate responsibility structure
In the management literature, as well as in the economic and strategic literatures, several
assumptions have been made about goals that managers pursue. On the one hand, neo-classical
economists (e.g. Friedman, 1970) assume that managers are only motivated by self-interest and that
the only corporate responsibility is to make a profit. On the other hand, Carroll (1979, 2001) argues
for the existence of four types of corporate social responsibility: economic, legal, ethical, and dis-
cretionary. When multiple stakeholders’ interests are considered as ends, managers can be obliged to
seek a balance between multiple motives rather than maximize shareholder value (e.g. Freeman,
1984; Mitchell et al., 1997). Stakeholder theory proposes that managerial goals are developed in
collaboration with a diversity of internal and external stakeholders, with potentially conflicting
claims (Freeman, 1984). Choice may reflect a compromise between a variety of considerations
of which shareholder value may be just one (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). This compromise may
lead managers to perceive the pressure of diverse stakeholders as a constraint on the financial per-
formance of their firms, leading to the perception of a trade-off between economic and social
responsibility.
Another stream of research, based on instrumental rationality logic, argues that there is not
necessarily a trade-off between economic and social goals (e.g. Collins, 1994; Donaldson and Pre-
ston, 1995; Jones, 1995; Russo and Fouts, 1997). This conception stipulates, along with the neo-
classical view, that the ultimate motivation of firms and managers is economic performance and
shareholder value. However, the instrumental view includes corporate social responsibility as means
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and motives to achieve corporate economic responsibility goals (Kotler and Lee, 2005; McWilliams
and Siegel, 2001; McWilliams et al., 2006). Based on a cost-benefit analysis, McWilliams and Sie-
gel argue that there is an optimal corporate social responsibility spending level, which maximizes
shareholder value. For example, firms may achieve a favorable image or relationship with stake-
holder groups, such as customers, while pursuing corporate social responsibility. Similarly, Wright
and Ferris (1997) argue that managers could make some decisions that may be perceived as socially
responsible (e.g. divesting of South African assets), but that may in fact be self-serving decisions to
increase their personal reputations. Therefore, according to instrumental rationality logic, corporate
economic and social responsibility are compatible.
To sum up, some research streams propose or assume the existence of a trade-off between cor-
porate economic and social responsibility, others argue that both sets of responsibility are compa-
tible. From an institutional perspective (North, 1990; Scott, 1995; Williamson, 2000), we argue
and hypothesize that whether managers perceive economic and social responsibility as compatible
or incompatible is embedded in or partially determined by their national and institutional environ-
ment (Christie et al., 2003; Schlegelmilch and Robertson, 1995; Vogel, 1992). Indeed, managers’
corporate responsibility perspectives represent espoused values (Schein, 1986) the structure of
which is likely to be shaped by institutional, economic, and cultural factors (Hofstede et al., 2002).
Cross-national differences
Cross-national differences in corporate responsibility structure may be attributed to the influence of
societal institutions (e.g. Aguilera et al., 2007; Campbell, 2007; Pinkston and Carroll, 1994; Schle-
gelmilch and Robertson, 1995). North (1990: 3) argues that institutions serve as constraints to reg-
ulate economic activities by providing the rules of the game. Institutions interact with both
individuals and organizations (North, 1990; Scott, 1995), and influence individual decision-
making by signaling which norms, behaviors, and choices are acceptable and which are unaccepta-
ble (Peng and Heath, 1996). By providing limits to the set of behaviors and choices of individuals
and organizations, institutions provide a stable structure for economic exchanges, thereby reducing
uncertainty (North, 1990).
The institutional framework is comprised of both formal and informal constraints on individual
and organizational behavior (North, 1990). Formal constraints include political, judicial, and eco-
nomic rules and contracts, whereas informal constraints include the codes of conduct, norms of
behavior, and conventions that are embedded in culture and ideology. Informal institutions are the
crystallizations of culture, and culture is the substratum of institutional arrangements (Hofstede
et al., 2002). Three elements are particularly influential in the structure of managers’ corporate
responsibility perspectives: national culture and values, the corporate governance system, and the
educational system.
There is a growing consensus in the comparative institutional literature that nations embody a
coherent institutional logic. However, Aguilera and Jackson (2003) note that this literature tends to
hold the behavior of the actors within each nation constant. By doing so, one runs the risk of
presenting an oversocialized view in the sense that it implies that all actors fully conform to the
norms, values, and rules of their society. In line with Aguilera and Jackson (2003), we adopt a
variant of institutional theory that stresses the interplay of institutions and individual actors
(Scharpf, 1997; Williamson, 2000). The new institutional view is similar to Granovetter’s (1985)
embeddedness theory, in that it assumes an ongoing interaction between a nation’s institutions and
its actors, which influences the range of individual behaviors. Drawing insight from this literature,
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we reason that there is variance in individual perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors about the trade-
off between corporate economic and social responsibility within countries, but that variance is less
than that across countries (Lubatkin et al., 2007).
National culture
Aspects of national culture may influence managers’ corporate economic and social responsibility
perspectives (see Williams and Aguilera, 2008, for a recent review). In his seminal work on cultural
differences, Hofstede (2001; Hofstede and Hofstede, 2004) described two dimensions,
individualism-collectivism and power distance, which are likely to influence managers’ corporate
responsibility structure.
A cultural dimension identified by Hofstede (2001; Hofstede and Hofstede, 2004) that is par-
ticularly relevant to better understand differences in managers’ corporate responsibility structure is
power distance. Power distance is defined as ‘the extent to which less powerful members of
organizations and institutions accept and expect that power is distributed unequally’ (Hosfstede,
2001: p. ix). In large power distance cultures, it is considered legitimate that less powerful members
are dependent on more powerful members. As a consequence, privileges and status symbols for
those in higher positions are both expected and popular. In these cultures, the most powerful
members also expect their power to be recognized and respected. Conversely, in small power
distance cultures, inequalities are minimized, independence of the less powerful is valued and
encouraged, and status and class symbols are frowned upon (Hodgetts and Luthans, 1993). The
concept of power distance has its roots in the family structure and is pervasive in the insti-
tutions that socialize members of the culture (school, church, and social organizations). In large
power distance cultures, organizations are centralized, and they include large differences in
authority, salary, and privileges between those at the top and those at the bottom. In small
power distance cultures, organizations are decentralized, there is more consultation in decision-
making, and differences in salary and perquisites are minimized. In small power distance cul-
tures, powerful institutional shareholders and large individual shareholders may behave in a
socially responsible manner toward other stakeholders, including dispersed individual/retail
shareholders. In large power distance countries, dominant shareholders are likely to use their
power to curb managerial discretion to their own advantage and push for the maximization
of shareholder value at the expense of weaker stakeholders such as employees and customers.
In such countries, less powerful stakeholders are likely to accept such a shareholder value max-
imization perspective. Therefore, we expect managers in large power distance countries to per-
ceive incompatibility between economic and social responsibility. On the other hand, in small
power distance countries, there is more power balance between shareholders and other stake-
holders who are powerful enough to control the dictate of shareholder value maximization.
Therefore, managers, based on instrumental rationality, are likely to perceive that social
responsibility is a means to achieve their economic responsibility goals. In such countries, cor-
porate economic and social responsibility are likely to be perceived as compatible. Conse-
quently, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1: The larger power distance in a particular country, the more managers view corporate
economic and social responsibility as incompatible goals.
Individualism is characterized as the emphasis of personal goals over group goals (Hofstede, 2001;
Hofstede and Hofstede, 2004). Several specific differences between individualists and collectivists
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are relevant to the shaping of manager’s corporate responsibility perceptions (Waldman et al., 2006).
Individualists have independent selves, primarily organized and made meaningful by reference to
their own internal repertoire of thoughts, feelings, and actions, rather than by reference to the
thoughts, feelings, and actions of others (Aaker and Maheswaran, 1997; Markus and Kitayama,
1991). Individualists are more short-term oriented and use a cost-benefit analysis (economic model)
to evaluate business deals (Hofstede, 2001). Such a cost-benefit analysis may demonstrate to indi-
vidualistic managers that it is in their firm’s best interest to be socially responsible as it will provide a
positive image or relationship with stakeholders, such as customers, which in turn will lead to higher
profits (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). Individualistic cultures are conducive to the development of
managers’ perceptions of the compatibility between corporate economic and social responsibility,
because in such cultures social goals are likely to be perceived as instrumental to economic goals.
In collectivistic cultures, the self is defined as part of a group. Being a member of a group is an
important indication of identity and achievement. Collectivists subordinate their personal goals to
the goals of the collective (Triandis, 1995). Success is defined in terms of the success of the group
(Hofstede, 2001). People with interdependent selves (i.e. with collectivistic values) are usually more
attentive and sensitive to others (Markus and Kitayama, 1991) and more empathic (Furrer et al.,
2000) than those who have independent selves and who possess more individualistic values. One
may argue that the necessity to take into account and satisfy the conflicting claims of a large number
of stakeholders may lead collectivistic managers to perceive a necessary trade-off between achiev-
ing corporate economic and social responsibility. However, collectivist identities being rooted in
commitment to an in-group, one could also expect managers to feel less obligation to satisfy a broad
range of stakeholders. Furthermore, one may argue that over time collectivistic cultures have devel-
oped robust routines and mechanisms to enable them to cope better with managing conflicting
claims than individualistic cultures. As a consequence, there is no clear-cut rationale concerning
goal compatibility for individualists versus collectivists.
In line with this, there is mixed empirical evidence as concerns the difference in perceived goal
compatibility between individualists and collectivists. Christie et al. (2003) found that while most
(individualistic) American managers (98 percent) expressed their disagreement with the statement
that ‘being ethical and being profitable do not go together’, only 71 percent of the Indians and 38
percent of the Koreans, who are more collectivistic, did so. They found that American managers, in
general, have a deep understanding of the role of ethics in business, and seem to believe strongly that
‘being ethical’ and ‘being profitable’ are not mutually exclusive, which is also consistent with the
findings of Vogel (1992). On the other hand, Vogel (1992) also found that German managers, who
are less individualistic than Americans, are relatively more skeptical about the compatibility
between ethics and profitability. Given the contradicting arguments and empirical evidence already
outlined, we expect managers with collectivistic values to be likely to balance or at least take into
account the claims of multiple stakeholders. Therefore, we do not expect a clear difference between
countries with collectivistic values and those with individualistic values as concerns goal
compatibility.
Corporate governance system
Corporate governance refers to ‘those administrative monitoring and incentive mechanisms that are
intended to reduce conflicts among organizational actors due to differences in incentives’ (Lubatkin
et al., 2007: 43). In other words, governance concerns the structure of rights and responsibility
among the parties with a stake (i.e. stakeholders) in a firm (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Aoki,
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2000). The strictness of a corporate governance system can be defined by its targeting of multiple
stakeholders and its consequent orientation to respecting and trying to reconcile the interests of all
groups of stakeholders. Countries vary in the strictness of their corporate governance system and the
extent to which the claims of a broad set of stakeholders are taken into account and protected.
Countries with a strict corporate governance system possess strong accounting and auditing stan-
dards, effective lawmaking bodies, clear property rights, efficient legal frameworks, and indepen-
dent judicial systems to ensure that the interests of all firm stakeholders are taken into account by
managers. In countries with less strict corporate governance systems, a particular group of stake-
holders (e.g. shareholders or unions) may become dominant in influencing managerial goals.
Because a strict corporate governance system seeks to take into account the rights of multiple
stakeholders, with potentially conflicting claims, managers in countries with stricter corporate
governance systems are more likely to perceive a trade-off between economic and social responsi-
bility and therefore to see these goals as incompatible. On the other hand, in countries with less strict
corporate governance systems, managers have more latitude to pursue the goals which are the most
important for them without taking into account the interests of the other stakeholders. Therefore,
because of this latitude or freedom, they might not perceive any incompatibility between corporate
economic and social responsibility. Hence:
Hypothesis 2: In countries where institutional standards of corporate governance are stricter, managers view
corporate economic and social responsibility as being more incompatible goals.
Type of managerial education
Among the informal institutions identified by North (1990), education has an important effect on the
taken-for-granted beliefs and values that are imposed on, or internalized by, social actors (Scott,
1995). The legitimacy of managers’ perspectives on corporate responsibility depends on managers’
different worldviews, which are influenced by their educational backgrounds and the diffusion of
cognitive models of control among them (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; DiMaggio and Powell,
1983). As such, business schools act as homogenizing institutions through the diffusion of these
cognitive models of control. Ghoshal (2005) suggests that business schools propagate ideologically
inspired theories, which, unlike theories in the physical sciences, tend to be self-fulfilling (Ferraro
et al., 2007; Gergen, 1973). For example, teaching theories, such as Agency and Transaction Costs
theories, which assume that people behave in self-interested ways or opportunistically and
draw conclusions for goal setting based on that assumption, induces managerial attitudes and
behaviors that are likely to enhance an economic perspective on corporate responsibility among
future managers (Ferraro et al., 2007; Frank et al., 1993, 1996; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996).
Ghoshal (2005: 77) further explains ‘Whether right or wrong to begin with, the theory can
become right as managers – who are both its subjects and the consumers – adapt their beha-
viors to conform with the doctrine.’ On the other hand, teaching the importance of corporate
social responsibility and ethical behavior is also related to the level of ethics of business stu-
dents (Yoo and Donthu, 2002).
Over time, European and US-based business schools have developed a range of different and
quite distinctive approaches to management education (Antunes and Thomas, 2007). For example,
US managers typically receive education in ‘general’ management, with a strong emphasis on
finance (Antunes and Thomas, 2007). The diffusion of shareholder value as management ideology
in the last decade reinforced financial goals within the firm (O’Sullivan, 2000). In contrast, German
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managers typically hold PhD degrees in technical fields such as engineering or chemistry. German
management ideology traditionally stresses Technik – achieving technical excellence as a manager’s
central goal (Lawrence, 1980). German managers thus tend to adopt a corporatist or pluralistic view
of the firm as serving multiple constituents. These factors lean away from pursuing merely financial
interests and toward strengthening functional orientations (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). In a func-
tional view of management, teaching each functional management discipline separately favors the
assumption that managerial functions are somewhat unrelated and can be treated independently,
therefore increasing the perception of cross-functional goal compatibility. On the other hand, an
integrated view of management provides business students with integrative, cross-functional
courses, which present more critical incidents (e.g. marketing favors customized products and oper-
ations prefers a standardized product) where goal compatibility is actively questioned. This may
activate a view that business goals are not fully compatible even in a well-managed company.
Overall, the domination of the business function view in US style MBAs (Mintzberg, 2004) leads
managers to perceive corporate economic and social responsibility as two independent, yet com-
patible goals. Antunes and Thomas (2007) argue that American-style business schools do not
encourage managers to incorporate an integrative philosophy directly into the daily functioning
of their workplaces and do not provide sufficient ethical and professional guidance. European-
style business schools have developed their own identities, styles, and approaches to management
education, with a strong focus on reflective, integrative, and action-based learning (Antunes and
Thomas, 2007), which have led managers to perceive corporate economic and social responsibility
as two interdependent, yet incompatible goals. However, we do not consider functional versus inte-
grated approaches to management education to be country-specific but rather related to particular
educational institutions within countries. Hence:
Hypothesis 3: Future managers who are taught a functional view of management tend to view cor-
porate economic and social responsibility as compatible, whereas future managers who are taught an
integrated view of management tend to view corporate economic and social responsibility as
incompatible.
Methodology
To develop the instrument for assessing corporate responsibility, we followed the recommended
procedures for building psychometric scales (Churchill, 1979; Churchill and Peter, 1984). We first
used exploratory factor analysis on a subset of the total sample to derive items that feature the two
sets of corporate economic and social responsibility. Multigroup confirmatory factor analysis was
then used with the full sample to assess the instrument’s cross-national invariance. Latent mean
analysis was used to measure the extent to which the importance of the dimensions of corporate
responsibility differ in particular countries from the United States set as baseline country.1 We also
assessed the degree of perceived responsibility compatibility at a global level as well as for individ-
ual countries.
We first assessed the cross-national invariance of our measurement instrument at the individual
level using multigroup confirmatory factor analysis. Then, to test if variance within countries is
smaller than across countries, we ran a multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) with coun-
try and gender as independent variables, work experience (in years) as covariates, and economic and
social responsibility as dependent variables. A significant country effect means that variance
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between countries is larger than within countries. Therefore, analysis at the country level becomes
meaningful (Hofstede, 2001).
After having established the significance of a country effect, we ran a regression analysis to test
the hypotheses about the relationships between country-level factors and future managers’ percep-
tions of the compatibility or incompatibility of corporate economic and social responsibility goals.
Data and sample description
Data were collected based on the Business Goals survey by Hofstede and colleagues (Hofstede
et al., 2002).2 A list of fifteen different goals, related to both economic and social responsibility
drawn from the management literature, was put in questionnaire format. Respondents from evening
MBA classes were asked to score how important they thought each of these goals was for ‘the
typical successful businessperson in Country X’. Importance was rated for each goal on a five-point
scale. An academic network administered the same questionnaire to local evening MBA students.
The survey was administrated in the language of the education program. Thus, most locations used
the original English-language version. In three European countries (France, Germany, and the Neth-
erlands) back-translated translations were checked following recommended procedures for ensuring
translation equivalence (Van de Vijver and Leung, 1997). This resulted in a sample of 1805 respon-
dents from 16 countries (Australia, Bahamas, Brazil, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Hong
Kong, Hungary, India, Jamaica, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, the United Kingdom, and
the United States). Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the country samples.
Instrument development and assessment of cross-national invariance
Initial development of the scales. The fifteen corporate responsibility items were used as a starting
base for exploratory factor analysis. A subset of the total sample (600 respondents) was used in the
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Country Samples
Country Female Sample Size Male Total Agea Work Experiencea
Australia 28 65 93 34.8 (5.7) 13.5 (6.1)
Bahamas 34 4 38 33.5 (6.1) 14.7 (6.9)
Brazil 26 70 96 35.8 (4.8) 14.9 (5.6)
China 9 14 23 29.1 (4.9) 6.7 (5.7)
Denmark 26 26 52 33.1 (7.5) NA
France 34 156 190 33.6 (6.3) 10.3 (6.9)
Germany 27 57 84 23.9 (1.5) .8 (1.1)
Hong Kong 23 78 101 30.8 (4.5) 8.6 (4.9)
Hungary 39 66 105 29.4 (5.3) 5.8 (5.0)
India 22 77 99 23.5 (1.7) .9 (1.3)
Jamaica 30 15 45 33.3 (7.4) 12.1 (7.8)
Netherlands 17 93 110 36.5 (6.1) 12.9 (7.4)
New Zealand 37 69 106 39.1 (6.8) 19.5 (7.8)
Panama 41 24 65 27.7 (4.7) 6.3 (4.7)
United Kingdom 9 33 42 37.3 (6.7) 16.4 (7.6)
USA 209 347 556 27.6 (6.3) 7.7 (6.2)
Total 611 1194 1805 30.8 (7.2) 9.4 (7.6)
aIn years, average (standard deviation).
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first step to assess the factorial structure. We deleted items with smaller communalities and elim-
inated a third factor based on only two items (‘family interests’ and ‘patriotism, national pride’)
which was not obviously consistent, especially in a cross-national perspective. Two factors repre-
senting economic and social responsibility clearly emerged, accounting for 62 percent of the var-
iance. Factor 1 emphasized social responsibility with four items displaying high loadings:
‘respecting ethical norms’ (.79), ‘responsibility towards employees’ (.82), ‘responsibility towards
society’ (.82), and ‘staying within the law’ (.71). Conversely, economic responsibility items loaded
on factor 2, that is, ‘growth of the business’ (.73), ‘personal wealth’ (.79), ‘power’ (.80), and ‘this
year’s profits’ (.71). In the second step, exploratory factor analysis was replicated for each individ-
ual national group. Configural invariance was assessed at an exploratory level with the same pattern
of salient loadings being observed for all groups. The next step was to assess cross-national invar-
iance based on multigroup confirmatory factor analysis (Byrne, 2001).
The resulting scales describe corporate responsibility in terms of profit and wealth on the one
hand (economic responsibility) and responsibility toward employees, society, ethics, and the law, on
the other hand (social responsibility). Both dimensions reach a good level of internal reliability as
well as convergent validity (see Table 2). All items are significantly related to their construct,
supporting the assumed relationships between constructs and their indicators. Convergent validity
of individual constructs in the model is confirmed since the mean of squared factor loadings is equal
to or higher than .50 for all latent variables (rho of convergent validity, see Table 2). Discriminant
validity was assessed on the basis that squared correlation between the two constructs (.02) is much
lower than the variance shared by constructs with their measurement indicators (.60 and .57) (see
Fornell and Larcker, 1981).
Cross-national invariance assessment. Before comparing latent means across countries, mea-
surement invariance needs to be addressed at three levels: configural, metric, and scalar invariance
(Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 1998). Confirmatory factor analysis was used, based on a structural
equations modeling approach (see Byrne, 2001). Measurement equivalence was established by
using nested models and assessing whether statistically insignificant differences in fit indices
provide support for the invariance hypothesis. The results of the multigroup confirmatory factor
analyses support full configural invariance and partial metric and scalar invariance (see methodo-
logical appendix).
Table 2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results
Items
Stand.
Loading p-Level
Jöreskog
Rho
Rho of Convergent
Validity
Social Responsibility
Respecting ethical norms (TETHI) .79 .000
Responsibility towards employees (TEMPY) .81 .000 .86 .60
Responsibility towards society (TSOCI) .81 –
Staying within the law (TLAWS) .69 .000
Economic Responsibility
Growth of the business (TGROW) .63 .000
Personal wealth (TWELT) .83 – .84 .57
Power (TPOWR) .83 .000
This year’s profits (TPROF) .70 .000
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Full metric invariance is not necessary for making valid inferences about group differences
(Byrne and Watkins, 2003). When configural invariance is met and metric invariance partially met
(invariance constraints have to be relaxed for the loadings of a small number of items), then partial
scalar invariance should be tested. Most intercepts will be cross-nationally invariant, but the con-
straint of equality may be relaxed for some intercepts across countries. To assess invariance, we
remove equality constraints on some item loadings or intercepts, allowing for partial metric and sca-
lar invariance (see Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 1998). Latent mean analysis could then be used to
compare national groups, the mean of a particular group being set at zero (see Byrne, 2001). Dif-
ferences in latent means were tested by placing equality constraints only on those parameters known
to be invariant (Byrne et al., 1989). Factor loadings and intercepts for ‘growth of the business’ and
‘responsibility towards society’ were released, as well as the intercepts of ‘respecting ethical norms’
and ‘staying within the law’ (see methodological appendix). To assess corporate responsibility per-
ceived compatibility, the cross-national CFA model with all respondents taken together was derived
with satisfactory fit indices (Hu and Bentler, 1998, 1999; see methodological appendix).
Operationalization of variables
To test hypotheses relating country-level institutional characteristics to the perceived compatibility
of dimensions of corporate responsibility, we used secondary data from published sources. Per-
ceived compatibility between economic and social responsibility for each national group is mea-
sured based on their correlation for each country sample. A non-significant correlation between
social and economic criteria (that is, orthogonality in vectorial terms) means that respondents in
a particular national group consider the two types of goals to be unrelated and consequently com-
patible but not necessarily aligned (which we call weak compatibility). A significant positive cor-
relation between social and economic criteria means that respondents in a particular national group
consider both types of goals to be aligned and easy to pursue simultaneously (which we call strong
compatibility). A significant negative correlation between social and economic criteria means that
respondents in a particular national group consider both types of goals to be opposed, therefore dif-
ficult to pursue simultaneously and requiring a trade-off (which we call incompatibility).
Power distance and individualism. Variables related to national culture, that is, power distance and
individualism were operationalized using country scores in Hofstede (2001). Hofstede’s country
scores are the most widely used among international management scholars (Sivakumar and Nakata,
2001; Søndergaard, 1994), including the most recent research (Kirkman et al., 2006; Taras et al.,
2009).
Corporate governance system. A measurement scale for corporate governance systems was
developed based on data from the Global Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum, 2002).
Five items were selected because they highlight key components of corporate governance systems.
When data from over 80 countries were submitted to exploratory factor analysis, a single factor
emerged explaining 90 percent of the variance. These factor items displayed high loadings:
‘Strength of Accounting and Auditing Standards’ (.91), ‘Effectiveness of Lawmaking Bodies’ (.92),
‘Property Rights’ (.96), ‘Efficiency of Legal Framework’ (.99), and ‘Judicial Independence’ (.97).
Confirmatory factor analysis resulted in high model fits (GFI = .94; AGFI = .83; CFI = .99).
Cronbach alpha was .97 and Jöreskog rho was .97. Given its high internal reliability, the resulting
scale was used as an indicator of strictness of corporate governance systems.
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Managerial education. Type of managerial education contrasts functional and integrative educa-
tion styles and was operationalized at the business school level3 by a dummy variable (1 for
functional-based and 0 for integrative-based education style). As previously discussed, US-like
business schools favor functional education, whereas non-US business schools have more integra-
tive programs. Based on a qualitative content analysis of MBA program websites, we classified
respondents from Australia, Hong Kong, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States
as receiving a functional-based managerial education and respondents from Brazil, France, Ger-
many, Hungary, India, and the Netherlands as receiving an integrative-based managerial education.
Economic development. As country wealth may influence the perception of the compatibility
between economic and social responsibility, we decided to use a country economic development
level as a control variable. To measure economic development, we used the gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita, which is the most direct and often used measure of the economic development of a
country (Getz and Volkema, 2001). In this study, the statistics published for 2001 by the United
Nations Statistical Division (http://unstats.un.org/unsd/default.htm) were used. Scores for country-
level indicators are presented in Table 3.
Data analysis and empirical findings
Global assessment of perceived compatibility between social and economic responsibility
Table 4 provides a summary of latent mean differences for national groups for the two subscales
(economic and social responsibility). Latent mean comparisons for both subscales are based on the
US group mean being constrained to zero. Differences should be interpreted as referring to the
Table 3. Country-Level Indicators
Country Individualism
Power
Distance
Corporate
Governance
Managerial
Educationa
GDP/Capita
(2001)
Australia 90 36 1.56 1 26,552
Bahamas 91 40 1.48 0 22,700
Brazil 38 69 .02 0 7,759
China 20 80 -.05 1 4,329
Denmark 74 18 1.53 1 33,500
France 71 68 .42 0 25,074
Germany 65 35 1.30 0 25,715
Hong Kong 25 68 1.16 1 25,581
Hungary 80 46 .44 0 12,941
India 48 77 .35 0 2,464
Jamaica 39 45 .18 0 3,890
Netherlands 80 38 1.30 0 26,242
New Zealand 79 22 1.34 1 20,725
Panama 11 95 -.69 0 5,986
United Kingdom 89 35 1.63 1 24,421
U.S.A. 91 40 1.33 1 34,888
a1 = functional; 0 = integrative
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United States as the baseline country. Respondents in most countries place social responsibility at a
higher level of importance than US respondents (Australia, Brazil, Hong Kong, and Hungary).
German respondents appear to be an exception by considering social responsibility as less important
than US respondents. Respondents in the majority of countries consider economic responsibility
more important than US respondents with the exception of Jamaica and Panama, who consider
corporate economic responsibility less important.
On average, future managers see corporate economic and social responsibility as relatively
incompatible (-.077; p < .001). However, this global perceived corporate responsibility incompat-
ibility should not be overestimated since the negative correlation between both latent constructs,
even though significant, is relatively small. Table 4 provides correlation patterns between the two
dimensions of corporate responsibility for all countries.
Country, gender, and work experience effects
We performed multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) where the dependent variables
were summative scales for economic and social responsibility and the independent variables were
nationality and gender. Work experience was used as a covariate. The Interaction effect between
nationality and gender was not significant and consequently removed for parsimony.
MANCOVA showed a significant effect for nationality (Wilks’ lambda =.893, F = 6.963,
p < .001) only, as reported in Table 5. Main effects of gender and work experience were not
significant. For gender, empirical findings are consistent with CFA results. When the CFA model
is estimated based on male respondent data (-.089; p < .001), there appears to be no significant
difference in terms of perception of goal compatibility as compared with female respondents
(.061; p < .032).
Table 4. Cross-National Comparison of Corporate Responsibility Compatibility and Importance
Country
Correlation Economic/
Social Responsibility
Latent Mean Difference/US
Social Responsibility
Latent Mean Difference/US
Economic Responsibility
Australia (AUL) -.16 .34*** .19†
Bahamas (BAH) .01 -.13 -.17
Brazil (BRA) -.30* .47*** .10
China (CHI) .63* .31 .80**
Denmark (DEN) .50** .08 .61***
France (FRA) -.41*** .10 .08
Germany (GER) -.40** -.32** .45***
Hong Kong (HCH) -.30* .16† .26*
Hungary (HUN) -.32** .37*** .59***
India (IND) -.43*** -.08 .02
Jamaica (JAM) .23 -.05 -.37*
Netherlands (NET) -.33** -.13 .22**
New Zealand (NZL) .07 .03 .20*
Panama (PAN) .04 -.05 -.26*
United Kingdom (UK) -.00 .16 .30†
USA (baseline country) .06 – –
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
292 International Journal of Cross Cultural Management 11(3)
Hypothesis testing
To test Hypotheses 1 to 3, we conducted a hierarchical regression analysis. The compatibility (i.e.
correlation) between economic and social responsibility was used as the dependent variable and
country-level indicators for power distance, individualism, corporate governance, managerial edu-
cation, and GDP per capita were used as independent variables. In the first step, we entered GDP per
capita only to control for the effect of country wealth. The other independent variables were entered
in the second step. To account for sample size difference between countries, cases were weighted
based on sample size. In addition, to take into account the significant correlation between power
distance and individualism (r = -.759***) and the resulting potential multicollinearity, we regressed
power distance on individualism and used the unstandardized residuals of this regression as a mea-
sure of individualism controlled for power distance. We also assessed multicollinearity by examin-
ing the variance inflation factor (VIF) and the conditioning index. The respective values were
significantly below the commonly accepted thresholds of 10 and 30 (Hair et al., 1998). The results
are presented in Table 6.
To rule out the alternative explanation by economic development and to control for country
wealth, we computed a first regression model in which only GDP per capita was entered as inde-
pendent variable. The model is significant with a R2 of .076. The effect of GDP per capita is positive
(β = .276, p-value < .001). This means that the richer a country, the more compatible perceived
corporate economic and social responsibility are. In the second step of the hierarchical regression
analysis, we entered the other independent variables. R2 increased significantly (ΔR2 = .637,
p-value < .001) to reach.712 (p-value < .001), indicating that national culture and institutions
have a significant effect on the perceived compatibility of corporate economic and social
responsibility, independently of country wealth. To test our hypotheses, we examined regression
coefficients in the second model.
Hypothesis 1, which stated that the larger (smaller) power distance in a particular country, the
more future managers view corporate economic and social responsibility as incompatible (com-
patible), is supported with a negative and significant coefficient (β = -.716, p-value < .001) between
power distance and the compatibility between economic and social responsibility. Concerning the
influence of individualism/collectivism, there is a significant residual effect of individualism con-
trolled for power distance on future managers viewing economic and social responsibility as rel-
atively incompatible (β = -.085, p-value < .001).
Hypothesis 2 stated that, where institutional standards of corporate governance are stricter, future
managers view economic and social responsibility as more incompatible goals. The hypothesis is
supported with a negative and significant coefficient of -1.124 (p < .001). Concerning the effect of
Table 5. MANCOVA Results
Effect Economic Responsibility Social Responsibility Wilks (F-value)
Nationality F-value (p-value) 7.668 (.000) 6.197 (.000) .893 (6.963***)
Gender F-value (p-value) .760 (.383) 3.560 (.059) .998 (2.199)
Work Experience F-value (p-value) 1.718 (.190) .306 (.580) .999 (.995)
N = 1805; Countries: AUL, BAH, BRA, CHI, DEN, FRA, GER, HCH, HUN, IND, JAM, NET, NZL, PAN, UK, and USA.
Note: None of the interactions was significant and therefore they were removed for parsimony. Data for work experience in
Denmark were missing and were replaced by the mean.
*p < .05; **p < .01;***p < .001.
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managerial education, Hypothesis 3 proposed that in business schools where MBA programs
propagate a functional (integrated) view of management, students tend to view economic and social
responsibility as independent (incompatible) goals. The hypothesis is also supported with a positive
and significant coefficient of .888 (p < .001).
Discussion and conclusion
The parsimonious scale of corporate economic and social responsibility that has been developed in
the present research displays high internal reliability and its cross-national invariance, although par-
tial, is demonstrated. It has the potential to be extended to a larger set of countries. Future managers
from a diversified sample of countries consider that there is a necessary trade-off between corporate
economic and social responsibility goals, rather than perceiving them as compatible. There are
country differences in the perceived importance and compatibility of economic and social respon-
sibility for future managers. Compared to our baseline country, the United States, other countries
tend to perceive lower corporate responsibility compatibility, to put slightly more emphasis on both
economic and social responsibility on average. Differences in perceived compatibility of aspects of
corporate responsibility of future managers can be explained by variables at three different institu-
tional levels: culture, corporate governance, and managerial education. At the cultural level, differ-
ence in perceived compatibility is mostly related to power distance and not so much to
individualism, a result that confirms Vogel’s (1992) findings and the three-country comparison of
Christie et al. (2003). In contexts where institutional settings related to corporate governance are
stricter and more sophisticated, providing for a real balance between stakeholders’ interests, respon-
dents perceive aspects of corporate responsibility as more compatible than in countries where cor-
porate governance standards may not yet be on the agenda (or may be legally decided but not
actually implemented), where future managers perceive these dimensions of corporate responsibility
as conflicting. As hypothesized, managerial education is shown to matter. It is the single most sig-
nificant covariate, giving credence to the argument of Ghoshal (2005) that future managers tend to
align their behavior with the doctrines they have been taught.
Table 6. Regression Analysis of the Compatibility between Economic and Social Dimensions of Corporate
Responsibility
Baseline Model b Complete Model b
GDP/Capita .276*** .136***
Power Distance -.716***
Individualism (residual effect)a -.085***
Corporate Governance -1.124***
Managerial Educationb .888***
R2 .076*** .712***
DR2 – .637***
Notes: N = 16, Countries: AUL, BAH, BRA, CHI, DEN, FRA, GER, HCH, HUN, IND, JAM, NET, NZL, PAN, UK, and USA.
Cases are weighted by sample size to take into account sample size differences across countries.
a To reduce multicollinearity between power distance and individualism, we regressed power distance on individualism and
used the unstandardized residuals as indicators for individualism controlled for power distance.
b ME, 1 = functional; 0 = integrative.
***p < .001.
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Theoretical implications
Our results provide support to institutional theory, which highlights the importance of formal and
informal institutions on future managers’ perceptions (Lubatkin et al., 2007; Scott, 1995). Cultural,
regulatory, and educational institutions shape future managers’ perceptions about the compatibility
or the incompatibility between corporate economic and social responsibility. This combined
influence further indicates that these factors are not isolated but that they act as a whole in an
integrated institutional system (Peng and Heath, 1996; Vogel, 1992). As argued by Hofstede et al.
(2002), institutions can be seen as the crystallizations of culture, culture being the substratum of
institutional arrangements.
Concerning future managers’ corporate responsibility structure, contrary to the instrumental
rationality logic (e.g. Collins, 1994; Wright and Ferris, 1997), we did not find support for a positive
relationship between economic and social responsibility (i.e. strong compatibility). In the country
sample (except for Chinese and Danish respondents), we found that future managers either perceive
a trade-off between economic and social responsibility or see them as independent (i.e. weak compat-
ibility). In countries with large power distance, collectivistic values, or weak corporate governance
standards, and/or integrative managerial education, future managers see corporate economic and
social responsibility as more incompatible. In these countries (Brazil being the exception), future
managers tend to prioritize the economic responsibility over the social responsibility, which is con-
sistent with the neo-classical assumption about the self-interested human nature (Friedman, 1970).
We found that in several countries with smaller power distance, more individualistic cultures, or
stricter corporate governance systems, and/or functional managerial education, future managers
tend to view corporate economic and social responsibility as compatible goals. This provides
support to the idea that multiple goals and consideration for others’ interests as means to economic
ends make managers seek to use corporate social responsibility to achieve corporate economic
performance. Therefore, managers’ social responsibility goals may reflect instrumental goals to
increase shareholder value (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001).
Managerial implications
Our research findings suggest that in several countries there is no perception of strong goal com-
patibility. When interviewed about self-interested and other-oriented business goals, future manag-
ers consider, at best, that such goals are independent (i.e. weak compatibility), and most respondents
consider that they are difficult to compromise. Managerial education, especially its functional form,
often takes for granted that ‘everything is possible’, that is, companies and their managers could be
simultaneously highly profit-oriented, generous, responsible, and honest. However, even if they are
indoctrinated in such a way, future managers do not fully believe in such a message. This is proven
by the lack of support for a positive correlation between dimensions of corporate responsibility.
Managerial education should more clearly emphasize the conditions under which business goals can
be made compatible and allow for some critical discussion of the taken-for-granted compatibility
assumption. Doing this probably implies a departure from both functional and integrated views
of management, since they cannot properly account for the practical, down-to-earth situations where
goal conflicts become evident. In this respect, we argue in favor of going back to a case study
approach that de-emphasizes managerial doctrine in favor of problem resolution through group dis-
cussion, confrontation of ideas, and consensus building.
The importance of corporate governance systems is highlighted by this research. Our argument is
that congruence with deep-seated attitudes toward the compatibility of dimensions of corporate
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responsibility is a condition for making such systems work in practice. Causation goes both ways:
rather than being merely an antecedent of corporate governance systems, such deep-seated attitudes
may also be changed over time by successful governance that increases perceptions of compatibility
between dimensions of corporate responsibility. A large discrepancy between formal and real gov-
ernance is likely to occur where only legal dispositions are taken without the necessary enforcement
arsenal. As a consequence, a gradual rather than radical introduction of corporate governance stan-
dards in settings where they are virtually unknown is recommended.
Limitations and future research
The direction of causality is assumed, but not demonstrated by this research. It may be simply that
corporate responsibility incompatibility is a covariate of power distance (not a consequence). The
regression analysis performed does not allow us to prove causation. Similarly, it is difficult to
disentangle the view of management propagated by business education programs from beliefs about
the degree to which corporate responsibility are compatible since causality may run both ways.
Country samples varied in size, gender composition, and age distribution. The US accounts for
30 percent of the total sample. We recognize that the more than proportionate influence of the US
data does not allow us to reach a culture-general solution. In cross-national research, it is a priori
relevant to have similar sample composition in every country surveyed, to achieve comparability
of data. However, the search for perfectly matched samples across survey countries, as a way to rule
out individual characteristics (i.e. gender, age) as alternative explanations for differences, may be an
illusion. Mere similarity across countries may clash not only with representativeness of local popu-
lations in country samples but also with real comparability across countries. Future research should
target an extension of data collection to a larger set of countries with increased representativeness
both in geographic and cultural terms.
Conclusion
While in seven countries corporate economic and social responsibility are perceived as conflicting,
in only two countries are these responsibilities perceived as strongly compatible, and in another
seven countries they are considered to be independent or weakly compatible. We also show that
differences in perceptions of responsibility importance and compatibility can be explained by
institutional and cultural differences rather than by the level of economic development or individual-
level variables such as gender and work experience. Further research should take into account such
cross-national differences when studying managerial attitudes and behaviors, especially when they
relate to corporate social responsibility.
Methodological appendix: Assessment of cross-national invariance
Multi-group confirmatory factor analyses for the national groups should be performed to assess
whether there is measurement equivalence between the groups. Configural invariance is met when
the items exhibit the same basic pattern of salient and nonsalient loadings across countries, cultures,
or groups studied. Metric invariance is met when, in addition to configural invariance, loadings are
nonsignificantly different across countries. If conditions of configural invariance and metric invar-
iance are satisfied, the researcher should proceed to test for scalar invariance, which deals with item
intercepts (mostly related to consistency in response styles). Scalar invariance can be tested by
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imposing an equality constraint on the latent means. For further technical advice on how to proceed
for testing measurement invariance see: Steenkamp and Baumgartner (1998), Vandenberg and
Lance (2000), Byrne (2001), and Schaffer and Riordan (2003).
The first step is to test configural invariance, that is, whether all items load on the same factor in
each national group. Therefore, the same model was estimated simultaneously for the sixteen
countries (baseline model). Factor loadings were expected to be statistically significant for each
group and the overall model had to exhibit satisfactory fit indices. Given the relatively high number
of observations in the dataset (1805), relying on the chi-squared test was impossible due to its sen-
sitivity to sample size. Instead, a combination of fit indices such as CFI, TLI, and RMSEA4 was
used as is usual in confirmatory factor analysis (Byrne, 2001). The overall model was acceptable
(CFI = .89, TLI = .84, and RMSEA = .036). The only problematic loading is that of the item
TGROW (for item abbreviations, see Table 2) for Germany (p = .107). Configural invariance was
shown to be met.
The next concerns were metric and scalar invariance. Here again, the chi-squared test was not
used to investigate a possible worsening in fit between constrained and baseline models. Since the
difference in chi-squared is not reliable due to large sample size, we opted for a measure based on
the change in CFI between constrained and baseline models.5 The threshold values for ΔCFI as con-
cerns measurement invariance are as follows (Vandenberg and Lance, 2000): ΔCFI ≥ -.01: the invar-
iance hypothesis should not be rejected; -.01 ≥ ΔCFI ≥ -.02: non invariance is suspected; -.02 ≥
ΔCFI: the invariance hypothesis should definitely be rejected and tests for partial invariance should
be implemented.
In addition to the ΔCFI criteria, we imposed additional constraints for strengthening the invar-
iance test: TLI and RMSEA should not deteriorate, i.e. no decrease in TLI and no increase in
RMSEA should be observed between constrained and baseline models.
To assess metric invariance, factor loadings were constrained to be equal across all national groups.
CFI change between constrained and baseline models was -.02, suggesting that the overall model was
not fully metric invariant. Each factor had to be tested separately for partial metric invariance by
releasing constraints on particular loadings one at a time and checking for ΔCFI.6 If ΔCFI was larger
than or equal to -.01 and there was no deterioration in TLI and RMSEA, the released itemwas causing
invariance across groups. It should not be set to equality across the seventeen countries. Once the
nonmetric invariant item(s) was/were identified, scalar invariance was explored.
Scalar invariance was tested by imposing an additional constraint to the metric invariant model,
that is, item intercepts were set equal across all national groups. A nonmetric invariant item cannot
Table A1. Measurement Invariance
Factors Items Metric Invariance Scalar Invariance
Social
Responsibility
TLAWS Invariant non invariant, intercept released
TSOCI non invariant, loading released non invariant, intercept released
TEMPY Invariant invariant
TETHI Invariant non invariant, intercept released
Economic
Responsibility
TGROW non invariant, loading released non invariant, intercept released
TPROF Invariant invariant
TPOWR Invariant invariant
TWELT Invariant invariant
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be scalar invariant (Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 1998). Therefore, only loadings and intercepts of
items which were metric invariant were constrained to equality in the scalar invariance model. At
this stage, relying on CFI for comparing models was impossible since the CFI value computed by
AMOS is inflated when means and intercepts are estimated. Thus, differences in TLI and RMSEA
were used to investigate the items which were scalar invariant. If either TLI or RMSEA did not
change in the proper direction, one more parameter was released. This process was repeated until a
satisfactory solution in terms of partial invariance was found.
Some economic responsibility items were non metric invariant (ΔCFI = -.025), due to the item
TGROW. ΔCFI was reduced to an acceptable level (ΔCFI = -.01) when TGROWwas released while
TLI and RMSEA did not deteriorate (ΔTLI = .064; ΔRMSEA = -.011). In the subsequent tests for
partial scalar invariance, all loadings and intercepts, except TGROW, were constrained to be equal
across countries. The CFI criteria as well as changes in alternative fit indices (ΔTLI = .128;
ΔRMSEA = -.009) indicated that TGROW was the only nonmetric and nonscalar invariant item for
economic responsibility.
The social responsibility factor was also shown to be not fully metric invariant due to ΔCFI being
-.017. When the factor loadings of the item TSOCI were set free rather than constrained to be equal
across groups, ΔCFI decrease was only .008. Partial scalar invariance was examined on the basis of
possible deterioration of TLI and RMSEA for each intercept release. The first model, in which factor
loadings and intercepts were set free for TSOCI, did not reach partial scalar invariance (i.e. TLI
improved whereas RMSEA worsened: ΔTLI = .031; ΔRMSEA = .007). Trying different combi-
nations of intercept constraints, the sole scalar invariant item was TEMPY. By freeing intercepts and
factor loadings for TSOCI as well as intercepts for TETHI and TLAWS, partial scalar invariance
was met with TLI increasing over the baseline model (ΔTLI = .04) while RMSEA remained
unchanged.7 To sum up, TGROW and TSOCI were nonmetric invariant and TETHI as well as
TLAWS were nonscalar invariant (see Table A1).
Notes
1. Cross-national invariance measurement based on confirmatory factor analysis frees loadings (for nonmetric
invariant items) and intercepts (for nonscalar invariant items) for particular national groups. This process
takes into account response set biases both for extreme/median response style and for the yea/nay-saying.
Non-standardized data should be used when performing multigroup confirmatory factor analysis. Recent
research indicates that relying on standardized data in cross-national/cultural research may result in ambig-
uous results (Fischer, 2004). Response styles, rather than being bias obscuring true measurement, are reflec-
tive of communication styles that are an integral part of culture (Smith, 2004; Van Hemert et al., 2002).
Correcting response set biases would then potentially remove substantive variation related to country/culture.
2. The Business Goals Network database (Hofstede et al., 2002) was used, with the addition of Denmark and
extra data from New Zealand (hence 1805). We do not consider US groups from (four) different regions as
separate national groups as in Hofstede et al. (2002). We removed respondents located in Hawaii, due to the
unavailability of country-level data for this context.
3. In countries where data were collected from multiple schools, it appears that they used the same type of
education.
4. CFI, comparative fit index; TLI, Tucker-Lewis index; RMSEA, root mean square error of approximation.
5. This criterion is used with large samples. As our dataset is large (1805), the ΔCFI criteria hold.
6. At this stage, the baseline model was one in which the factor loadings, the intercepts, and the latent means
were unconstrained.
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7. The range between lower and upper bounds diminished (RMSEAlower: from .024 to .026; RMSEAupper:
from .039 to .036).
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